Military Restriction Triggers the Right to a Speedy Civilian Trial by Panny, James E.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
7-1-1976
Military Restriction Triggers the Right to a Speedy
Civilian Trial
James E. Panny
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
James E. Panny, Military Restriction Triggers the Right to a Speedy Civilian Trial, 30 U. Miami L. Rev. 1083 (1976)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol30/iss4/13
CASES NOTED
separate and apart from freedom of the press, with which to attack
such restrictions. A recent case in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit " used this dual approach by invalidating
a direct ban on publication as a violation of freedom of the press and
invalidating a ban on courtroom sketching since there was no valid
reason for it.
Significantly, the court in the instant case was explicit that the
right of access is not absolute. Under certain circumstances, the
litigant's right of privacy may be a cogent reason for the exclusion
of the public. By leaving this possibility open, the court struck an
appropriate balance between the right of the public to open govern-
ment, including the judiciary, and the right of litigants not to have
the most intimate details of their lives thrust into the public eye.
By recognizing both of these considerations, and accommodating
each to the other, the court has sought to solve the difficult problem
presented by two fundamental rights in conflict.
TAMMANY DON TENBROOK
Military Restriction Triggers the Right to a
Speedy Civilian Trial
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was
faced with a review of a denial of a speedy trial violation claim
based upon a delay of over 4 years from commencement of mili-
tary proceedings to a civilian indictment. In overruling the trial
court, the fourth circuit gave an in depth analysis of the "factors"
deemed controlling by the United States Supreme Court in re-
viewing such a claim. The author concludes that, notwithstand-
ing a finding of a violation in the principal case, the right to a
speedy trial may be at the mercy of prosecutorial discretion.
On May 1, 1970, appellant, a Captain in the United States
Army, was charged by the Army with the murders of his wife and
50. United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974).
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two daughters. After a required investigation, I the charges were dis-
missed on October 23, 1970. Two months later appellant was honor-
ably discharged from the service and he returned to the civilian
practice of medicine. The Justice Department continued its investi-
gation following appellant's discharge and, despite appellant's re-
peated requests that the investigation be ended as soon as possible,
the investigation continued for several years. Finally, on January
24, 1975, appellant was indicted by a grand jury for the murders.
At his trial, appellant moved for dismissal of the indictment on
alternative grounds of double jeopardy2 and denial of the right to a
speedy trial.3 The district court denied appellant's motions. The
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, stayed appellant's
trial and granted his petition for an interlocutory appeal.' The
fourth circuit held, reversed and remanded. The delay of over 4/2
years from the Army's accusation and detention of an accused in
May 1970, to his indictment in January 1975, violated the accused's
right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
Therefore, the prosecution was dismissed with prejudice. United
States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976).
Supreme Court decisions on the right to a speedy trial are of
relatively recent vintage. Judicial treatment of these types of cases,
although subject to general guidelines, is marked, through neces-
sity, by a case-by-case balancing approach of various factors pro-
mulgated by the Supreme Court. The most important decision on
the balancing test was Barker v. Wingo,5 wherein the Court identi-
fied the four factors as length of delay, reason for the delay, asser-
tion by the defendant of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.'
Although universally treated as a starting point for analysis of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial in any particular case, these
1. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as U.C.M.J.].
2. "No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. The court granted defendant's petition for an interlocutory appeal on August 15, 1975.
The court in its order noted that the rights asserted by MacDonald were too important to be
denied review, and that if review was postponed until the trial of the case, claimed rights
would be irreparably lost. United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 199 n.3 (4th Cir. 1976).
5. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
6. Id. at 530.
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four factors represent only general categories for in-depth analysis.7
Additionally, the Barker Court found that no one factor is to be
given priority nor is it of absolute necessity; rather, all are to be
viewed concurrently in arriving at a decision.'
Acknowledging this, the court in United States v. MacDonald
embarked upon a discussion of each particular Barker factor and its
relationship to the facts of the instant case.
The critical issue in the case was the identification of the event
marking the commencement of the delay. This was considered to be
essentially the spring board or "triggering mechanism"' to further
inquiry. In denying MacDonald's motion for dismissal, the district
court held that the right to a speedy trial arose in January 1975,
when MacDonald was "indicted." The fourth circuit, however,
delved into the circumstances surrounding the military procedures
of 1970 to determine if the pre-indictment period was of constitu-
tional significance under Supreme Court guidelines.
In 1971, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Marion'0
that the right to a speedy trial accrued from either the time of the
indictment or the time of actual arrest." Since there was no signifi-
cant delay following the civil indictment, the decision hinged on
whether or not MacDonald was "arrested" by the Army. After view-
ing the factors surrounding the military events and the Army's ear-
lier investigation, the majority and the dissent came to opposite
conclusions on this point.
The majority opinion stressed the limitations on MacDonald's
freedom in concluding that his military restriction "was the func-
tional equivalent of a civilian arrest allowing him to invoke the sixth
amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial."'" On April 6, 1970, Mac-
Donald was informed that he was under suspicion, relieved of his
duties and restricted to quarters. 3 The court found that MacDonald
7. See, e.g., Rudstein, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Barker v. Wingo in the Lower Courts,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 11, 58. See also Comment, Devitalization of the Right to a Speedy Trial:
The "Per Case" Method v. the "Per Se" Theory, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 106, 114 (1973), wherein
the author suggests that the approach advocated in Barker is really nothing new at all.
8. 407 U.S. at 533.
9. Id. at 530.
10. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
11. The Supreme Court stated "it is either a formal indictment or information or else
the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage
the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 320.
12. 531 F.2d at 204.
13. Id. at 200.
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was "under arrest" from the date that the commanding officer
charged MacDonald with the murders - May 1, 1970. The court
took the view that since the "charge"' 4 amounted to an arrest war-
rant subjecting MacDonald to arrest' and since he was confined to
his quarters and was relieved of his duties, " the constraints of actual
arrest justified further inquiry into the speedy trial claim.
Looking at the same restrictions, 7 the dissent concluded that
they were insufficient to constitute an "arrest." The difference is
explainable in the opposing views as to the continued viability of the
1885 Supreme Court decision of Wales v. Whitney"5 in which the
petitioner was denied a writ of habeas corpus. In Wales, the Secre-
tary of the Navy had ordered the Navy's chief medical officer to
remain within the bounds of the city of Washington, D.C. This was
held to be insufficient restraint for habeas corpus purposes in 1885.
The MacDonald majority noted that since Wales is no longer con-
trolling in cases involving a speedy trial claim. On the other hand,
the dissent would have resurrected Wales as the standard in analyz-
ing military arrest procedures and how they relate to the civilian
system.S0
14. U.C.M.J. art. 30, 10 U.S.C. § 830 (1970) states that:
(a) Charges and specifications shall be signed by a person subject to this chapter
under oath before a commissioned officer of the armed forces authorized to ad-
minister oaths and shall state -
(1) that the signer has personal knowledge of, or has investigated,
the matters set forth therein; and
(2) that they are true in fact to the best of his knowledge and belief.
15. U.C.M.J. art. 10, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1970) reads in part: "Any person subject to this
chapter charged with an offense under this chapter shall be ordered into arrest or confine-
ment, as circumstances may require .... "
16. U.C.M.J. art. 9, 10 U.S.C. § 809(a) (1970): "Arrest is the restraint of a person by an
order, not imposed as a punishment for an offense, directing him to remain within certain
specified limits. Confinement is the physical restraint of a person." See Manual for Courts-
Martial, 20 a (U.S. 1969 rev. ed.).
17. "MacDonald was restricted to his room in the Bachelor Officers' Quarters. An armed
MP was placed outside his door. An escort officer accompanied him when he left the quart-
ers." 531 F.2d at 213 (Craven, J., dissenting).
18. 114 U.S. 564 (1885).
19. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 n.8 (1973) wherein the court
observed that "[i]nsofar as former decisions, . . . Wales v. Whitney .. .may indicate a
narrower reading of the custody requirement, they may no longer be deemed controlling."
20. Analogies to civilian procedure may not have been necessary. The fact is that the
two systems of criminal justice are not alike. An analysis of military cases will show that
restraint or formal presentment of charges triggers the right to a speedy trial. See United
States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971); United States v. Mladjen, 19
[Vol. 30:10831086
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In considering the fact that MacDonald was free from detention
or bail from the termination of the Article 32 proceedings until the
indictment, the court decided that since MacDonald was still under
suspicion and subject to the threat of another prosecution, his so
called "freedom" did not dispel the effects of the initial accusation."
In arriving at its decision, the court analogized MacDonald's predic-
ament to that of the petitioner in Klopfer v. North Carolina.2 In
Klopfer, the defendant was the subject of a nolle prosequi 3 which
left him with no forum within which to proceed with his vindication.
The indictment was subject to reinstatement at anytime which left
the accused entirely at the mercy of the solicitor. Here, while peti-
tioner was not under indictment, the court correctly noted that
MacDonald was subject to the same uncertainty and anxiety. Mac-
Donald's fear of prosecution was evidenced by the fact that he re-
tained counsel since he knew he was still subject to an investigation.
Having held that the military procedures "triggered" the right
to a speedy trial, the court concluded its analysis of the first factor
by stating that a delay of over 41/2 years certainly fulfilled the
minimum length requirements24 so as to require inquiry into the
U.S.C.M.A. 159, 41 C.M.R. 159 (1969); United States v. Williams, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 37
C.M.R. 209 (1967); United States v. Kama, 47 C.M.R. 838 (N.C.M.R. 1973).
In defining the scope of restriction that is necessary, MacDonald's restriction to quarters
certainly appears to fit within the framework of decided military cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Haynes, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 124, 35 C.M.R. 94, 96 (1964) ("Restriction to quarters
or to barracks is in fact arrest ... "); and, United States v. Smith, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 38
C.M.R. 225 (1968).
As to absence of actual confinement in a brig, it should be noted that the military,
generally, disfavors pre-trial incarceration and also distinguishes between officers and en-
listed men. Historically, the need for all available manpower left incarcertation as a last
resort. See generally Boiler, Pretrial Restraint in the Military, 50 MIL. L. REv. 71 (1970). Pre-
trial incarceration is only to be used where necessary to insure the accused's presence at the
trial or because of the seriousness of the charge. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 20 c (U.S.
1969 rev. ed.). Also, "the decision whether to confine an accused person until his trial is
wholly discretionary . . . ." Lermack, Summary and Special Courts-Martial: An Empirical
Investigation, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 329, 350 (1974).
21. It should be noted that had this case been subject to the new Federal Speedy Trial
Rule, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 et seq. (Supp. 1976), dismissal of charges by the military would have
tolled the "statutory" time period. However, as per 18 U.S.C.A. § 3173 (Supp. 1976), "[no
provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial
as required by amendment VI of the Constitution."
22. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
23. Nolle prosequi, in a criminal charge, refers to the situation where the prosecution will
forego proceedings against the defendant.
24. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972), a 5 year delay was characterized as
extraordinary (although other mitigating facts were present). A 28-month delay was deemed
19761
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other factors of the Barker balancing test.
The second factor considered in determining whether defen-
dant's right to speedy trial was violated was the reason for the delay.
For purposes of this analysis, the court divided the entire period into
three phases of delay - (1) the initial period taken up by the mili-
tary proceedings; (2) the next 18 months wherein the Department
of Justice undertook another investigation; and, (3) the period from
the submission of a report recommending prosecution by the Army's
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to the Department of Justice
until the date of the grand jury proceedings more than 2 years later.
Reasons for delay generally fall into three categories giving rise
to a system of weighing by the courts: deliberate attempts to delay
which are weighted most heavily against the government; neutral
reasons, such as negligence, which are weighted "less heavily"
against the government; and valid reasons, which are excusable. 5
The court held that the first phase was excusable since the
Army investigation and the Article 32 proceeding justified inaction
by civilian authorities. The second phase was not weighted "heav-
ily" against the government since the charges were previously dis-
missed for insufficient evidence, the case was complex, and the in-
vestigators were not dilatory. However, for the third phase, the
government had not provided any satisfactory explanation; there-
fore, the court determined that this factor must be weighted
against the government." Two important subfactors in the court's
reasoning were the CID's recommendation to prosecute more than
2 years prior to the grand jury proceeding and the testimony of the
excessive in United States v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1973). In United States v. Holt,
448 F.2d 1108, 1109 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971), the court stated that "[t]he
defense claim has prima facie merit if the lapse between arrest and trial is longer than one
year."
25. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
26. Even though there is not a deliberate attempt to delay, negligence or indifference as
a reason for the delay may be weighted against the government. See generally Fleming v.
United States, 378 F.2d 502 (1st Cir. 1967); Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F.2d 263 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); State v. Hollars, 266 N.C. 45, 145 S.E.2d 309 (1965).
It is interesting to note that the military courts have established a clear cut standard for
this factor, i.e.,
in the absence of defense requests for continuance, a presumption of an Article
10 violation [the military's statutory version of the speedy trial provision] will
exist when pretrial confinement exceeds three months. In such cases, this pre-
sumption will place a heavy burden on the Government to show diligence, and in
the absence of such a showing the charges should be dismissed.
United States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 118, 44 C.M.R. 166, 172 (1971).
[Vol. 30:1083
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Assistant United States Attorney (who was familiar with the case)
that the delay in FBI analysis from 1970 until 1974 was due to
"government bureaucracy."
The third Barker factor is the defendant's assertion of his right.
In Barker the Court's treatment of this factor was somewhat para-
doxical. The Supreme Court on the one hand rejected a strict
"demand-waiver" approach" and held it to be merely a "factor."
On the other hand, the Court stated that "failure to assert the right
will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a
speedy trial."2
In MacDonald, however, the fourth circuit had little trouble in
deciding this factor in favor of the defendant since the latter had
written several letters to the Department of Justice inquiring into a
final decision, had offered to submit to questioning by the Depart-
ment of Justice, and had waived immunity at the grand jury pro-
ceedings.
The fourth and final factor considered was prejudice to the
defendant. As is true with the other factors, an affirmative showing
of prejudice is not a necessary prerequisite to an eventual finding
of a speedy trial violation.29 Prejudice is evidenced by the infringe-
ment upon any of several interests of the defendant that must be
protected in speedy trial cases: prevention of oppressive pretrial
incarceration; minimization of anxiety and concern which comes
from public accusation; and preservation of the ability of the defen-
dant to effectively defend himself.3 0 Here, the court found prejudice
to the second two interests - freedom from anxiety and ability to
defend oneself. As to the first factor, the court noted one who "is
not restrained may nonetheless be prejudiced."3
The court found anxiety and concern on MacDonald's part
from his knowledge of the continuing investigation, constant threat
of prosecution, hiring of an attorney, and inquiry into the unre-
solved nature of the case.
Impairment of the ability to defend oneself is the most obvious
prejudice to a defendant in a speedy trial violation. MacDonald
27. Under this approach, "a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives
his right." 407 U.S. at 528.
28. Id. at 532.
29. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973).
30. 407 U.S. at 532; United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
31. 531 F.2d at 207-08, citing Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 221 (1967).
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claimed, and the fourth circuit agreed, that his ability in this regard
was impaired.32 This was evident from the scattering of Army wit-
nesses throughout the country and the circumstantial nature of the
case. Moreover, economic considerations were important according
to this court (e.g. counsel was retained at MacDonald's expense,
and interviewing and insuring the presence of the widely scattered
witnesses would be time consuming and expensive).33
It is noteworthy that prejudice in MacDonald was evident from
the record. In cases where prejudice is not so clear, a difficult and,
as of now, undefined concern in speedy trial cases lies in the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. Should the defendant be made to prove
prejudice when claimed? Or, should the government, with its vastly
superior investigative force, be made to show that a delay is not
prejudicial to the defendant?34 In United States v. Ewell,35 a claim
of prejudice was dismissed as speculative, thus giving rise to a plac-
ing of the burden on the defendant. However, Barker views delay
as "presumptively prejudicial" once the delay is seen as sufficient
to justify further inquiry." This would seem to shift the burden to
the government to prove an absence of prejudice. In keeping with
the later approach, the MacDonald court appears to have viewed
the placing of the burden as a function of time of delay. First, as
seen previously, 41/2 years is viewed as sufficient to justify further
inquiry. Then, with the burden shifted, the court correctly rejected
the government's argument that the defendant was not prejudiced
by stale witnesses, and other factors, due to the preservation of the
testimony at the Article 32 hearing. In other words, the government
had not sustained its burden of proving an absence of prejudice.3"
32. Examples of the hardship are given in Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 476, 482 (1968):
A delay can impair an individual's ability to prepare a defense in several ways.
Documents or other physical evidence may deteriorate or be lost. Potential wit-
nesses may die or disappear, and those witnesses who are available may be unable
to remember the events in question. Furthermore, the passage of time may
weaken the defendant's ability to recall the facts or witness that would have
comprised his alibi or other defenses [footnotes omitted].
33. 531 F.2d at 208.
34. There is a split of authority on this point. See 58 CORNELL L. REv. 399, 409 (1973),
for a list of cases going both ways.
35. 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
36. 407 U.S. at 530 (1972).
37. Since MacDonald involves many comparisons between the military and civilian
criminal justice systems, it is interesting to note that under the military system the burden
is definitely placed on the government in such a situation. United States v. Burton, 21
U.S.C.M.A. 112, 116, 44 C.M.R. 166, 170 (1971).
[Vol. 30:1083
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When all of the factors in a case are found to be in the de-
fendant's favor - here all were found to be in MacDonald's favor
- the required dismissal" of a speedy trial case directly follows
under the balancing test rationale.
By finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial, the court was
spared the necessity of a decision as to the double jeopardy claim
which would have involved a case of first impression. [In dictum,
the court noted that there has never before been a case of a prosecu-
tion following dismissal after an Article 32 hearing.]39 While custom
in the military imputes finality,40 this does not necessarily mean
that a civilian court would be bound thereby. In light of its holding
with respect to the speedy trial provision, the court declined to
determine the effect of such a dismissal, viewing such a determina-
tion as advisory in nature.4'
MacDonald exemplifies the great confusion possible when the
outcome of a claim depends on a balancing test. This is particularly
unsatisfactory where a constitutional right is involved. The obvious
danger of such uncertainty is evident from the possibility that a
different circuit, or for that matter the same circuit at a different
time, can view similar facts and come to an opposite conclusion (as,
indeed, the dissent did here). The fourth circuit reaffirmed the Su-
preme Court's requirement of finding a triggering event as a prere-
quisite to further inquiry into the speedy trial claim. The courts may
be placing an unreasonable amount of discretion in the hands of the
government. MacDonald was lucky. He had a prior, triggering act
on the government's part upon which to base his claim, i.e., the
military arrest. (Even then, the dissent would have held otherwise.)
Without this, it is suggested that a defendant is left at the mercy of
the prosecution. In other words, the interests of the defendant, pre-
sumably protected by the speedy trial right, are not so protected
until the government arbitrarily decides to "pull the trigger." In
light of this discretion, the right to a speedy trial may have been
written out of the Constitution.2
38. The severe remedy of dismissal is the only possible remedy. Strunk v. United States,
412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1973).
39. Slip Opinion at 29-30. (This was not reprinted in the Federal Reporter.)
40. 531 F.2d at 209.
41. Id.
42. The Court, in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), stated that the sixth
amendment need not be pressed into service in pre-arrest or pre-indictment situations since
the statutes of limitation protect the accused. 404 U.S. at 323. The fallacy of that argument
19761
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It should be noted that there is "a societal interest in providing
a speedy trial which exists separate from . . . the interests of the
accused."4 Society's interest stems from the backlog increase from
delay in bringing cases to trial, the opportunity for those released
on bail to commit other crimes, the temptation for the accused to
jump bail, and escape, and the detrimental effect on rehabilitation
from the delay between arrest and punishment." It is suggested that
these interests are not served by the present status of speedy trial
case law. Perhaps a solution which would take into account the
interests of both society and the accused can be found. However,
any change which would enhance the rights of the accused is doubt-
ful in light of the "general indifference to the rights of those accused
of crime exhibited by the Supreme Court under the leadership of
Chief Justice Burger. . . ."I' The end result is that the interests of
both society and the accused will suffer.
JAMES E. PANNY
Expanded Right to Voluntary Dismissal Upheld
In the noted case, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
right to take a voluntary dismissal is absolute and can be had
even after the judge has granted defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. The author, after reviewing the history and case law on
voluntary dismissals, concludes that although the decision was a
correct one in light of the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420
(a)(1), the purpose of the rule would be better served if it were
revised so as to put greater limitations on the availability of a
voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff.
Petitioner and her husband brought suit against respondents
and the Insurance Company of North America, to recover damages
resulting from an automobile accident. At the charge conference,
is apparent in murder cases, such as MacDonald's, where there is no statute of limitations.
18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1970) reads: "An indictment for any offense punishable by death may be
found at any time without limitation except for offenses barred by the provisions of law
existing on August 4, 1939."
43. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
44. Id. at 519-20.
45. Rudstein, supra note 7, at 58.
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